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INTRODUCTION

In 1992, the Venezuelan Congress passed landmark antidumping legislation.' The legislation marked a first in the Venezuelan legal system, introducing mechanisms to correct distortions that the practices of dumping and
subsidization generate.2 Additionally, the new antidumping legislation created the Comisi6n Antidumping y sobre Subsidios [Antidumping and Subsidy
Commission, hereinafter Commission] to administer these mechanisms. Yet
Venezuela's decision to adopt antidumping legislation is not without controversy.
With its passage of this legislation, Venezuela also entered the so-called
"antidumping club." This somewhat pejorative term refers to the many
countries during the last decade which, while reducing their traditional barriers to foreign trade, have increasingly used antidumping policies as the
favored means of protection for national industries. 3 The recent popularity
of the antidumping club, especially among developing countries, is a consequence of at least two related phenomena: (1) the economic adjustment
programs that many developing countries have undertaken and that have
resulted in freer international trade; and (2) the increasing importance of the
GATT system' in international economic relations.
International trade has grown steadily since the end of World War II.
Over the last decade, in particular, the number of nations that have played an
active role in this process has steadily increased. With the collapse of the
Soviet Union, many former socialist countries have rushed into the international market. Likewise, numerous developing nations, particularly in Latin

1. Ley sobre Practicas Desleales del Comercio Internacional [Law on Unfair
International Trade Practices] in GACETA OFICIAL DE LA REPUBLICA DE VENEZUELA [OFFICIAL
GAZETTE OF THE REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA] [hereinafter G.O.], No. 4441 Extraordinaire, June

18, 1992 [hereinafter Antidumping Law].
2. Unless otherwise indicated, the term "dumping" refers to practices of dumping or
subsidization, or both, and the term "antidumping" refers to policies or governmental measures
to prevent or correct distortions caused by dumping or subsidization, or both.
3. Cf J. Michael Finger, Antidumping Is Where the Action Is, in ANTIDUMPING: How
IT WORKS AND WHO GETS HURT 3, 6-7 (J. Michael Finger ed., 1993).
4. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [hereinafter GATT], reprinted in THE TEXT
OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE (1986).

The GATT system refers to

the institutions, rules, and principles originated in the 1948 General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, even though as a result of the Uruguay Round agreements, these will come to depend
on a new agreement or organization, i.e., the so-called GATT 1994 and World Trade Organization.
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America, have embarked on internationalist programs. Venezuela entered
this liberalizing process in 1989 with a major economic reform program.5
The GATT system's increased importance is closely linked to the liberalization of international trade. The number of territories admitted as contracting parties to GATT (the technical expression used to designate the
members of the agreement)6 over the last ten years is more than triple the
number admitted during the preceding decade.7 Venezuela, for example, became a contracting party of GATT in August 1990. The increased importance of the GATT system was vividly displayed in the recently concluded
Uruguay Round discussions. Initiated in 1986 to examine the efficacy of
GATT, the Uruguay Round established a framework to bring new subjects
into the discipline of GATT (or, more correctly, under the discipline of the
new "umbrella agreement" that will replace the central role of GATT).
These subjects include international trade in services, as well as new rules for
intellectual property and foreign investment.
In the antidumping area, these phenomena have a major relevance.
Countries are increasingly abandoning traditional instruments of protectionism such as high tariffs, quotas, import bans, and import licenses. Instead
they are relying on GATT-compatible mechanisms for the protection of
national industries.
As mentioned above, the Venezuelan antidumping legislation created an
administering agency and granted it authority to "hear and decide procedures
on dumping or subsidies."8 More specifically, in antidumping matters, this
Commission is empowered to initiate, suspend, and conclude investigations.
Consequently, the Commission must decide whether the alleged unfair
practice exists, what injury the practice caused, and what, if any, duties to
impose. 9 The rationale for this legislation was undoubtedly influenced by
international circumstances to which brief mention was made above. As a
result of such circumstances, the Congress introduced legislation on a matter
novel to the Venezuelan legal tradition. To the degree that antidumping is
an area of regulation with a longer tradition in other countries, it would be
reasonable to expect that drafters of antidumping legislation in Venezuela
5. See generally MoIStS NAIM, PAPER TIGERS AND MINOTAURS: THE POLITICS OF
VENEZUELA'S ECONOMIC REFORMS 50-51 (1993) (reviewing the major features of this reform
program).
6.

JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF

GATT: A

LEGAL ANALYSIS OF

87-89 (1969).
7. Between January 1984 and July 1993, 22 territories were admitted as new contracting
parties. In contrast, between January 1974 and December 1983, only seven territories were
THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE

admitted. With the accession of Paraguay, the number of contracting parties to GAIT rose

to 112. Focus: GATT NEWSLETTER (Media Rel. Div. GATT, Geneva, Switz.), July 1993,
at 5.
8. Antidumping Law, supra note 1, art. 27.
9. Id. art. 33.
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1993
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would have used such other countries' laws as a reference.
At the same time that the Venezuelan Congress was working on the
antidumping legislation, it also was considering legislation in other matters
of the same "package," such as a reform of the Consumer Protection Law
and a draft for antitrust legislation.' ° If and when passed, these three laws
would create a different agency to administer each law. Curiously, in the end
Congress chose a different form for the organization of each of the three
agencies.
II.

THE ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY IN THE VENEZUELAN
ANTIDUMPING AND SUBSIDY LAW

A. An Administrative Authority
The Venezuelan Antidumping Law concentrated all authority on
antidumping matters in a sole agency, the Commission. The legislation
created the Commission as an "agency ... ascribed to the Ministerio de
Fomento" and vested it with broad powers to investigate and decide on these
issues." Venezuela's antidumping authority thus has been granted to an
administrative agency (as opposed to, for example, a court). This is not the
case everywhere. The Canadian system, by contrast, apportions antidumping
authority between two different agencies - an administrative body and a
quasi-judicial tribunal. 2
The fact that Venezuela has placed antidumping authority in an administrative agency has important consequences. First, the Commission is subject to a general system of regulations that apply to the public administration
as a whole. Some of the most important of these rules are contained in the
Ley Orgdnica de ProcedimientosAdministrativos (LOPA). 13 In Venezuela,
organic laws have a special status. Considered by some to be a category of
laws between the Constituci6n de la Repriblica de Venezuela (Venezuelan
Constitution) and regular laws, organic laws generally prevail over regular
laws on the matter of their specificity. Laws, however, need not be in any

10. Proyecto de Ley de Protecci6n al Consumidor [Consumer Protection Law Reform
Project] and Proyecto de Ley para Promovery Protegerel Ejerciciode la Libre Competencia
[Law to Promote and Protect Free Competition Project].
11. Antidumping Law, supra note 1, art. 27 (emphasis added). Literally, the name of the
ministry could be translated as Ministry of Foment, or Development, although in practice, this
ministry has played the role of a Ministry of Trade and Industry. See also infra note 91.
12. The Revenue Canada, an "administrative body with specialized responsibility for
determining all matters relating to dumping," and the Canadian Import Tribunal, a "quasijudicial body with specialized responsibility for adjudicating the question of material injury."
Peter A. Magnus, The CanadianAntidumping System, in ANTIDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY 167, 178 (John H. Jackson & Edwin A. Vermulst eds., 1989).
13. Ley Orginica de Procedimentos Administrativos [hereinafter LOPA].
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specific matter in order to be passed as "Organic Laws." The only distinction
is a difference in the process of congressional approval. 4
The Antidumping Law has only two express references to the LOPA in
its text: (1) when dealing with the way of notifying "interested parties" of
Commission decisions; 5 and (2) when listing the requirements for petitions
to initiate investigations. 16 The Antidumping Law has no generic remission
to the LOPA for all matters not expressly regulated in the Antidumping Law,
but the lack of such generic remission can be deemed irrelevant. The LOPA
itself states that the national public administration will "conform its activity
to the prescriptions of [this] Law."' 7 The LOPA is thus the "law for the
activities of the National Public Administration, both Central and Decentralized."' 8 The LOPA establishes that "the administrative procedures
contained in specialized laws will be applied with preference to the ordinary
procedure in [this Law] in those matters which constitute the specialty."' 9
Nonetheless, the LOPA will be directly applied in all issues not resolved by
special laws such as the Antidumping Law in administrative procedures.
This standard applies regardless of whether they relate to first-degree procedures such as investigations, or second-degree procedures like administrative
reviews.
Another consequence of having antidumping authority placed with an
administrative agency is that the Commission is subject to the Venezuelan
Constitution's judicial review system. This system is known as the sistema
contencioso-administrativo,or contentious-administrative system. 2 In the
Venezuelan legal system, administrative acts such as those produced by the
Commission are "in whole subject to an administrative regime, the last stage

14. Constituci6n [Constitution] art. 163 (Venezuela).
15. Antidumping Law, supra note 1, art. 27.
16. Id. art. 39(1).
17. LOPA, art. 1.
18. Hildegard Rond6n de Sans6, Estudio Preliminar, in LOPA 7, 14 (1982).
In
Venezuela, "Central Public Administration" has been traditionally defined in opposition to
"Decentralized Public Administration." The Central Public Administration generally has been
thought of as comprising the ministries and administrative agencies with no autonomous corporate status. The Decentralized Public Administration would then comprise all administrative
agencies and entities with their own corporate status. Decentralized administrative bodies can
be organized according to public law or private law regulations. The former are, for example,
the so-called Autonomous Institutes; the latter are, for example, state-owned foundations or
companies.
19. LOPA, art. 47.
20. Contentious-administrative courts exercise judicial control over administrative activity,
by which these courts are empowered to "nullify administrative acts ... when they are contrary to the law ... [and] grant reparations whenever there are damages caused by
administrative responsibility." VENEZUELAN CONST., supra note 14, art. 206. This judicial review may be contrasted with administrative discretion regarding the convenience or wisdom
of a certain action, over which courts have no control once such discretion is granted.
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of which implies the inexorable possibility of their review in the contentiousadministrative procedure.", 21 The contentious-administrative system allows
interested parties to bring administrative acts to courts for judicial review,
and empowers such courts to control the legality of these acts.
Granting antidumping authority to an administrative agency is a positive
facet of the Antidumping Law. The administration of antidumping legislation
is a complex matter. Antidumping investigations involve economic,
accounting, legal, and other technical calculations. Very often a procedure
involves the need to take rules of international, community, national (domestic or foreign), and even local, origin simultaneously into account. It is
therefore a highly specialized matter, for which a team must be created with
adequate expertise and esprit de corps. In keeping with the Venezuelan
tradition of administrative organization and legislation, the administration of
policies with similar need for technical specialization has been entrusted to
administrative agencies. As mentioned, however, the judicial branch is still
able to exert control over the legality of the Commission's activity.
B. A Specialized and Sole Authority
The Venezuelan antidumping legislation grants authority in antidumping
matters to a single, specialized body: the Commission. In Venezuela, this
exclusive antidumping authority may again be considered a positive feature.
Not all countries concur with Venezuela's mono-tiered system, however. In
the United States of America, for example, antidumping authority is distributed between two bodies: (1) the Department of Commerce, which deals with
the issue of dumping or subsidy; and (2) the International Trade Commission,
which deals with the issue of injuries that such practices cause.22 In the
United States, critics claim that the existence of two different bodies creates
two sets of problems. First, there is a possible waste of both governmental
and private resources. Second, substantive disagreements between agencies
can create dissension and potentially conflicting policies. 23 The history of
public administration in Venezuela fully documents the potential peril of
granting several governmental entities possibly overlapping authority.24 In

21. Luis H. Farias Mata, El ProcedimientoAdministrativo en Venezuela, in 7 ARCHIVO
DE DERECHO PUBLICO Y CIENCIAS DE LA ADMINIsTRACION:
VENEZUELA Y COLOMBIA 277, 278 (1986).

DERECHO PUBLICO EN

22. See generally Gary N. Horlick, The United States Antidumping System, in
ANTIDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 12, at 99, 104-05; Tracy Murray, The Administrationof the Antidumping Duty Law by the Department of Commerce, in DOWN INTHE
DUMPs: ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNFAIR TRADE LAWS 23, 23-24 (Richard Boltuck & Robert
E. Litan eds., 1991).
23. Horlick, supra note 22, at 105-08.
24. See, e.g., Mois6s Naim & Ramr6n Pifiango, El Caso Venezuela: Una llusi6n de
Armonia, in EL CASO VENEZUELA: UNA ILUSiON DE ARMONiA 538, 551-53 (Mois~s Naim &
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response to these concerns, the creation of a sole and specialized agency
seems the best solution. Alternatively, the existence of two different
agencies, each assigned a different phase of the procedure, could lead to
further specialization of such agencies. In a governmental system with a
tradition like that of Venezuela, though, it is safer to assume that the objective of specialization could be better advanced by having different departments within only one body. This way the principle of "uniqueness of
administration," which states that "only one organism with authority should
exist for every activity that is to be assigned," 5 would be better achieved.
Similarly, it is wise to have a specialized agency in charge of the enforcement of antidumping legislation, as opposed to placing such a heavy
burden on an agency that simultaneously has to enforce other regulations.
Because antidumping is a highly specialized matter, the administration of
policies should take technical and legal rules of complexity into account. As
noted above, the best organizational solution would be to develop a team
with highly specialized economic, accounting, and legal skills. Additionally,
antidumping has only a superficial resemblance to other economic regulations, such as antitrust. It has been argued that, in the context of international trade, dumping is only a specific case of the generic practice of eliminating competitors through predatory pricing. 6 Predatory pricing in domestic markets is frequently sanctioned in antitrust regulations (also called
regulations for the promotion of competition). This is the case in Venezuela.27 Such argument resulted in the Venezuelan Congress considering the
possibility of creating a sole agency to administer both the Antitrust Law and
the Antidumping Law.28 In the end, however, the Congress opted to
Ram6n Pifiango eds., 4th ed. 1988) (arguing that public administration in Venezuela has long
suffered from a "demographic explosion of organizations" problem).
25. Cf Fernando Garrido Falla, La Administraci6n Unica: Problemiticade una Obviedad,
130 REVISTA DE ADMII.STRACION PUBLICA (Madrid) 7, 7 (1993). Strictly, Garrido deals with
the issue of unique administration in the context of vertical distribution of powers.
26. Cf John H. Barcel6 III, The Antidumping Law: Repeal It or Revise It, I MICH. Y.B.
INT'L LEGAL STUD. 66-67 (1979) (indicating that antitrust regulations may be the best solution
to predation in international trade, and that antipredation is "the proper touchstone of
Antidumping Law"). "[P]rotection should not take the form of a special antidumping law...
the existing domestic antitrust laws are entirely adequate to protect against the threat of
predation from domestic dumpers." Id. at 67.
27. See Ley para Promovery Protegerel Ejerciciode la Libre Competencia [Law to Promote and Protect Free Competition] in G.O., No. 34,880, Jan. 13, 1992 [hereinafter Antitrust
Law].
28. Article 50 of a text drafted by the Venezuelan Minister'o de Fomento, for example,
granted antidumping authority to a Superintendencia de Protecci6n de la Competencia
[Superintendency for Competition Protection], the same body proposed in the Antitrust Law
project. VENECONOMiA, ANTEPROYECTO LEY ANTI-DUMPING 27-31 (1991, photo. reprint).
Later the same year, however, article 42 of the antidumping law bill presented by the
Executive to Congress (and also drafted by the Ministerio de Fomento), incorporated a
Comisi6n Antidumpingy sobre Subsidios, to administer antidumping regulations. MINIsTERIO
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establish two agencies.
The creation of a specialized agency for each law is probably the best
solution for Venezuela. 9 Administering both laws requires quite different
approaches and techniques. Antitrust regulations mostly apply to practices
occurring within a national market, whereas antidumping regulations apply
to practices in the context of international trade. More important, the enforcement of antitrust regulations penalizes differential pricing according to
its effect on free competition, thus having a procompetitive effect that is
directly beneficial to consumers. The enforcement of antidumping regulations, on the other hand, generally attacks differential pricing per se, to the
extent that it causes injury to domestic production of like products.
Antidumping regulations apply regardless of whether the motive is to wipe
out competitors, and consequently frequently have an anticompetitive effect
that may prove directly detrimental to consumers. The reason for this difference is that, while the objective of antitrust regulations is to protect competition, the objective of antidumping regulations is to protect the domestic
competing industry. In contrast to the case of antitrust, the enforcement of
antidumping regulations implies the need to carry out procedures against
foreign producers, which frequently leads to applying international treaties
and negotiations.
Antitrust and antidumping are thus two very different sets of regulations,
with differing objectives, approaches, and procedures. The creation of a sole
agency to administer these two laws would have overloaded that agency.
The effect would have been to weaken its ability to perform its central task:
the adequate and technically correct administration of trade regulations.
1. The Relationship Between the Commission and the
Ministerio de Fomento
The creation of a sole and specialized authority does not mean, however,

DE FOMENTO, REPUBLICA DE VENEZUELA, [PROYECTO DE] LEY ANTIDUMPING Y SOBRE

SUBSIDIOS 25-29

(1991, photo. reprint).

29. But I am grateful to Gary N. Horlick, for pointing out that with international trade
permeating national economies, "imports effectively are the main form of competition." Letter
from Gary N. Horlick to author (Feb. 3, 1994) (on file with the author). There is certainly
a current trend towards linking trade and competition laws. See, e.g., North American Free
Trade Agreement Between the Governments of the United States of America, Canada, and the
United Mexican States art. 1504 (calling for the establishment of a Working Group to study
the "relevant issues concerning the relationship between competition laws and policies and
trade in the free trade area"). I still am not very convinced, however, of the convenience of
having a single agency handle antitrust and antidumping enforcement. In addition to
antidumping, there are several other areas of regulation that yield direct effects on competition, such as consumer protection laws, but this does not imply that the enforcement of all
these regulations should be enforced by a single agency. However, some kind of policy
coordination or harmonization would clearly be desirable.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol8/iss3/6

8

VENEZUELAN ANTIDUMPING AND SUBSIDY LAW

1993]

Castro-Bernieri: The Administering Authority in the Venezuelan Antidumping and Sub

that the Commission is the only relevant actor in antidumping matters in
Venezuela. Of crucial importance is the Ministerio de Fomento, the ascription ministry for the Commission.30 In Venezuela, every administrative
agency is -assigned, through the mechanism of "ascription," to a specific
ministry. The nature of the relationship between the Commission and the
Ministerio de Fomento is not very clear from the text of the Antidumping
Law. However, because it is a very important relationship, making the
Ministry in practice the actor with the most influence on the Commission, a
whole autonomous section has been devoted to the nature of such relationship.31
2.

The Relationship Between the Commission and the
Ministry of Finance

In the context of the so-called central public administration, the
Ministerio de Hacienda [Ministry of Finance], through its Direcci6n General
Sectorial de Aduanas [General Sectorial Directorate of Customs, hereinafter
Customs] is a main actor in antidumping matters in Venezuela. The
Antidumping Law establishes that "the customs service will be responsible
for the collection of provisional and definitive antidumping duties."32 Similarly, the Reglamento de la Ley sobre Prdcticas Desleales del Comercio
Internacional [Executive Regulations of the Antidumping Law, hereinafter
Antidumping Regulations] 33 instructs that "the decision of the Commission
to impose antidumping or countervailing duties shall be related immediately
to [Customs], enclosing the text of such decision."34 Moreover, the
Antidumping Regulations add that "as soon such notification is received...
the Director of [Customs] shall issue the instructions necessary so that such
antidumping or countervailing duties are collected... .,3' Finally, Customs
shall submit a monthly report to the Commission on the amount of
antidumping and countervailing duties, both provisional and definitive, collected during the preceding month; included therein must be a report on the
36
bonds posted for the provisional duties that have been imposed.
The collaboration between the Ministry of Finance to the Commission
must begin even before the Commission has imposed any duties. According

30. Antidumping Law, supra note 1, art. 27, para. 1.
31. See infra part Il.D.4.
32. Antidumping Law, supra note 1, art. 54.

33. Reglamento de la Ley sobre Prdcticas Desleales del Comercio Internacional
[Executive Regulations of the Antidumping Law], in G.O., No. 4567 Extraordinaire, Apr. 26,
1993 [hereinafter Antidumping Regulations].
34. Id. art. 75.
35. Id. art. 76.
36. Id. art. 77.
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to the antidumping legislation, the former must collaborate with the Commission "in the investigations tending to determine the existence of dumping
or subsidies." The Antidumping Law states that all other "public entities"
shall collaborate with the Commission, and then proceeds to list some of the
entities that are "especially" obligated. Among the latter, the Ministry of
Finance heads the list.37
3. The Relationship Between the Commission and the
Institute of Foreign Trade
Another relevant actor in antidumping matters in Venezuela is the
Instituto de Comercio Exterior [Institute of Foreign Trade, hereinafter ICE].
According to the Ley que Crea el Instituto de Comercio Exterior,8 the ICE
is the competent authority to "conduct studies, submit reports, and present
proposals" both in foreign trade matters, which includes trade policy, and in
economic integration, such as the relations between Venezuela and any integration accords or any "international organizations specialized in international
trade matters., 39 The Antidumping Law also obligates the ICE to collaborate
with the Commission in investigations intended to determine the existence of
dumping.40
The relevance of the ICE in antidumping matters goes beyond technical
assistance in Commission investigations. The ICE has traditionally been
Venezuela's "linking" entity in relations between Venezuela and the bodies
of the Acuerdo de Cartagena [Andean Pact]. In this respect, Andean
antidumping regulations have application in Venezuela and, with respect to
4
those regulations, the ICE is the Venezuelan "interlocutor.", 1
In addition, since Venezuela's admittance as a contracting party to
GATT, the ICE has been the agency responsible for the relations between
Venezuela and the other contracting parties of this agreement. Because the
GATT system also contains a set of rules pertaining to antidumping matters
(mainly rules that allow the control of the GATT-consistency of antidumping
measures taken by authorities of contracting parties), the role of the ICE in
this respect can be extremely important. It is thus interesting to note that, in
antidumping matters, the delegations from the Venezuelan government that
participate in meetings of the Andean Pact or GATT bodies usually are comprised of officials from both the Commission and the ICE.

37.
38.
Foreign
39.
40.
41.

Antidumping Law, supra note 1, art. 34(1).
Ley que Crea el Instituto de Comercio Exterior [Law that Creates the Institute of
Trade], in G.O., No. 29,294, Aug. 17, 1970 [hereinafter ICE Law].
Id. art. 3.
Antidumping Law, supra note 1, art. 34(1).
See infra part II.C.
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4.. The Relationship Between the Commission and the
Ministry of Foreign Relations
The Antidumping Law includes the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores
[Ministry of Foreign Relations] in its list of the public entities that shall
collaborate with the Commission in investigations tending to determine the
existence of dumping. 42 Although the Ministry of Foreign Relations is the
ICE's ministry of ascription, 41_ it is not only in this capacity that the
Ministry's assistance in antidumping investigations can be relevant. Indeed,
the Ministry of Foreign Relations can provide the Commission with invaluable assistance through the information that it may gather from its relations
with foreign governments and international organizations, through its relations with foreign missions in Venezuela, and most important, through its
diplomatic and consular personnel abroad. Whereas antidumping authorities
in developed countries often have the resources to conduct their own investigations in situ, this is not always the case for authorities in developing
countries . like Venezuela. This lack of resources thus makes them more
prone to need the assistance of agencies such as the Ministry of Foreign
Relations.
5. The Relationship Between the Commission and the
Other Ministries
The Antidumping Law also establishes a specific obligation with respect
to the Ministerios de Agriculturay Cria y de Energiay Minas [Ministries of
Agriculture and Livestock and of Energy and Mines]. The law requires these
ministries to collaborate with the Commission in order to determine the
injuries or threats of injuries to the industries under the auspices of the
respective ministries." Such a rule, in singling out these two specific ministries, would not make any sense, unless other ministries were not under a
similar obligation to investigate injuries or threats of injuries to industries that
they oversaw. As I have already pointed out, such is not the case in light of
the generic obligation of all public entities to collaborate with the Commission.45 What we have here is a deficiency of the legal text, which should
not have limited such express mention to these two ministries. A better
wording might have established a generic obligation to all public entities, or
to all ministries, to collaborate in investigations of injuries or threats of
injuries, with respect to all such industries in which these public entities, or

42.
43.
44.
45.

Antidumping Law, supra note 1, art. 34(1).
ICE Law, supra note 38, art. 1.
Antidumping Law, supra note 1, arts. 11-14 & 34(2).
Id. art. 34(1).
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ministries, are competent. Indeed, as a result of unfair practices in
international trade, there could be injuries or threats of injuries in industrial
sectors falling under the competence of a ministry other than the two the
Antidumping Law singled out. In each of these cases, the logical solution
is that, with respect to sectoral studies, the Commission should have the
collaboration of the most competent ministry.
Ministries in Venezuela could have an additional influence in
antidumping matters. In the Venezuelan institutional organization, the
Consejo de Ministros [Council of Ministers] and the so-called Gabinetes
Sectoriales [sectorial cabinets] have great importance.4 6 In strict legal
terms, both collegial bodies have limited, and mainly consultive (as opposed
to decisive), responsibilities. In practice, however, they have a dominant role
as designers of policy and as advisory bodies for the President of the
Republic. The President's power is constitutionally limited, so that she can
exercise certain of her functions only within the Council of Ministers.47
This constitutional limitation includes things such as issuing executive regulations of laws. An example of this practice is the Antidumping Regulations.
In light of the expanding relative importance of the Venezuelan economy's
non-oil-related foreign trade sector, and of Venezuela's use of antidumping
mechanisms to protect its national industries, both the Council of Ministers
and the Sectorial Cabinet for Economics increasingly will find themselves
discussing dumping issues and recommending executive actions on these
matters.
6.

Relationship between the Commission and the
President of the Republic

The President of the Republic has the power to issue executive regulations of laws, as a whole or in part, "without altering their [the laws'] spirit,
' Consequently, the Antidumping Law left,
objective, and rationale."48
by express reference, several points for the Executive Regulations of the Law to
develop. 49 The President issued these Antidumping Regulations in April
1993.50 Even a brief review of the matters that the Antidumping Law left
to Executive Regulations evidences that, as a result of her power to issue

46. Ley Orgdnica de la Administracirn Central [Organic Law of the Central Administration], arts. 9-10, in G.O., No. 3945 Extraordinaire, Dec. 30, 1986 [hereinafter LOAC]. See
generally Eloy Lares Martinez, Los Ministros, in 4 ESTUDIOS SOBRE LA CONSTITUCION:
LIBRO-HOMENAJE A RAFAEL CALDERA 2193 (1979) (describing the importance of the Council
of Ministers).
47. VENEZUELAN CONST., supra note 14, art. 190, para. 2.
48. Id. art. 190(10).
49. Antidumping Law, supra note 1, arts. 2(16) (h) & para. 1; 5; 6; & 7, para. 2.
50. See Antidumping Regulations, supra note 33.
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such regulations, the President has immense authority over the form and substance of the antidumping legislation's administration. A closer analysis of
the content of the Antidumping Regulations text only strengthens this assertion. The second paragraph of article 7 of the Antidumping Law, for example, leaves to the Antidumping Regulations the determination of "the adjustments that shall be made to the normal value or to the export price, in each
case, in order to ensure their fair comparison." In fact, such determination
was made in Chapter IV, Title I, of the Antidumping Regulations. The
important point here is that the comparison between the normal value and the
export price will determine whether dumping exists." Determining the existence of dumping is an essential prerequisite for the Commission being able
to impose antidumping duties.52 If Executive Regulations mandate that the
Commission introduce elements that will result in either an "upwards" adjustment of the normal value or a "downwards" adjustment of the export price,
the Commission will be more likely to make a positive finding on the existence of dumping. By the same token, if the Commission is mandated to
introduce elements that will result in a "downwards" adjustment of the
normal value, or an "upwards" adjustment of the export price, it will be less
likely to make a positive finding on the existence of dumping. Thus, even
through a subtle exercise of its regulating authority, the President may easily
stretch or shrink the grip of the antidumping legislation.
In some extraordinary circumstances, the President of the Republic may
even have the power to modify the Antidumping Law itself, through a socalled Decreto-Ley (Law-Decree). The President, however, can do this in
only two cases: (1) if she has suspended the exercise of the economic guarantee; or (2) if she has been previously enabled by the Congress of the
Republic, through a specific "enabling law."53 Although supposedly extraordinary in character, the first case has been quite common in Venezuela since
about 1939. In this time period, the economic guarantee contained in
successive Venezuelan Constitutions has been suspended by successive
presidential decrees (usually ratified by the Congress), which allowed the
President to issue decrees on matters otherwise reserved to the laws.54 In

51. Antidumping Law, supra note 1, arts. 2(5), 7.
52. Id. art. 15.
53. VENEZUELAN CONST., supra note 14, art. 190 (6), (8). The economic guarantee is
contained in article 96 of the Venezuelan Constitution. According to this guarantee,
"everyone may freely engage in any lucrative activity of his or her own choice, without any
limitations other than those established in th[e] Constitution, and those established in laws for
reasons of safety, health, and any others of social interest." As a consequence, in principle the
right to engage in any economic activity cannot be limited through presidential decree, but
only through laws passed by the Congress. Id.
54. See, e.g., Allan R. Brewer-Carias, La Constitucirn de 1961, in LA CONSTITUCION Y
sus ENMIENDAS 7, 110-11 (1991).
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July 1991, a new presidential decree briefly ended the suspension of the
economic guarantee," but the suspension was reinstated again in February
1994.56 The second case has happened several times, the most recent being
in August 1993, when Congress enabled President Ram6n J. Velisquez,
through the Ley que Autoriza al Presidente de la Reptiblica para Dictar
Medidas Extraordinariasen Materia Econ6mica y Financiera,57 to "issue
measures in order to correct the negative effects on the national agricultural
sector, produced by the inadequate administration of the laws to promote and
protect free competition and that about unfair practices in international trade
[Antitrust Law and Antidumping Law]. '"58 In neither of the above two
occasions was any Law-Decree issued in antidumping matters. It was not
done in the first case, during the time in which the economic guarantee has
been suspended, mainly because antidumping regulations are novel in
Venezuela. In the second case, regardless of the congressional mandate,
President Veldsquez decided not to act on the matter. Instead, he left the
issue to the government elected in the December 1993 elections. Neither
historical precedent, nor the extraordinary character of the possibility of
presidential intervention in matters usually reserved to Congress, however,
can safely assure that in the future the President will not employ a
presidential Law-Decree to modify the antidumping legislation.
7.

The Relationship Between the Commission and the
Congress of the Republic

The Congress of the Republic of Venezuela has at least three ways to
influence antidumping regulations. The first, and most obvious, one is
through its legislative powers as established in the Venezuelan Constitution,
according to which "it pertains to Congress to legislate on matters of the
national competence and on the functioning of the various branches of the
National Powers. 5 9 I will argue later that antidumping regulations are indeed part of such "matters of the national competence."6 ° It was in accor-

55. See Presidential Decree No. 1724 of July 4, 1991, in G.O., No. 34,752, July 10, 1991.
56. See Presidential Decree No. 51 of Feb. 26, 1994, in G.O., No. 35,410, Feb. 28, 1994.
When issuing the most recent suspension of the economic guarantee, President Caldera
signaled that he would only use his newly acquired extraordinary economic powers to suspend
application of a value-added tax. Caracas Imposes Economic Curbs, FIN. TIMES (London),
Feb. 28, 1994, at 7.
57. Ley que Autoriza al Presidentede la Repzblica para DictarMedidas Extraordinarias
en Materia Econ6micay Financiera[Law that Authorizes the President of the Republic to
Issue Extraordinary Measures in Economic and Financial Matters], in G.O., No. 35,280, Aug.
23, 1993.
58. Id. art. l(10)(c).
59. VENEZUELAN CONST., supra note 14, art. 139.
60. See infra part II.C.
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dance with such legislative powers that in May 1992, Congress passed the
Antidumping Law. According to the same Venezuelan Constitution, "laws
can only be abrogated by other laws, and also may be reformed in whole or
in part."'" Congress thus may at any time modify the Antidumping Law.
Second, Congress may use its budgetary authority to allocate financial
resources among the different branches of government.6 2 This is a less obvious way of intervening in the administration of antidumping regulation. In
this respect, the Venezuelan Constitution establishes that "no expenditure will
be made from the National Treasury, that has not been included in the
Budget Law."63 Congress exercises its budgetary authority through both the
Ley Anual de Presupuesto [Annual Law of Budget] and any successive
modifications contained in the so-called presupuestos adicionales[additional
budgets]. Through the exercise of such budgetary authority, and particularly
through its Permanent Finance Commissions in both chambers, Congress has
a heavy influence on the way in which the executive branch can administer
its policies.
Last, the Venezuelan Constitution grants powers to Congress "or its
Commissions [to] conduct the investigations that they may deem convenient,
in conformity with its regulations."'64 The same article also establishes an
obligation for "all functionaries of the public administration ... under the
penalties established by the laws, to appear before [these bodies] and turn in
all the informations and documents that they may require, in order to accomplish their duties .... This same obligation also involves private citizens.
,."The investigative powers of Congress are not limited to the
processes of passing or modifying laws.66 Indeed, because the Venezuelan
Constitution states that "Congress also exercises control over the National
Public Administration,"6' 7 such powers of investigation could also be used
in this latter context. Congress thus can use such powers to conduct an
investigation at any time (i.e., in foreign trade policy matters) and to issue
subpoenas to functionaries of the Commission, of other agencies, and even
to private citizens.
Substantial congressional powers do raise some interesting concerns. In
61. VENEZUELAN CONST., supra note 14, art. 177.
62. See, e.g., ALLAN R. BREWER-CARiAS, PRINCIPIOS DEL REGIMEN JURiDICO DE LA
ORGANIZACION ADMrNISTRATIVA VENEZOLANA 30-32 (1991) (describing generally the
budgetary powers of Congress over the Administration).
63. VENEZUELAN CONST., supra note 14, art. 227.
64. Id. art. 160.
65. Id.
66. See Jos6 Guillermo Andueza A., La Potestad de Investigaci6n de los Cuerpos
Legislativos, 13 REVISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO (Caracas) 41; see also Orlando Tovar
Tamayo, Las Facultades de Control e Investigaci6n del Congreso Venezolano, 14 REViSTA
DE DERECHO POBLICO (Caracas) 83.
67. VENEZUELAN CONST., supra note 14, art. 139.
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the United States of America, for example, Congress also has important
powers over economic and trade matters. Authors have called attention to
the issue of the possible influence of Congress (and congressional leaders)
on the activity of the authorities who administer antidumping regulations.68
Even the otherwise healthy concern of a congressperson to protect the interests of domestic industries, which may provide jobs to part of her constituency, may in some cases give rise to negative or dangerous situations. Some
congresspersons may be tempted to exert undue pressure on the antidumping
authorities, through any of the mentioned institutional mechanisms or through
some other, less-institutionalized ones, in order to influence a particular
decision. This is a difficult problem to resolve. Perhaps the best solution is
to attempt, as the Antidumping Law to some degree does, to guarantee the
greatest possible autonomy to the Commission.
8. The Relationship Between the Commission and the Judiciary
As an administrative agency, the Commission is subject to oversight
regarding the legality of its activities. Article 206 of the Venezuelan Constitution rests such control in contentious-administrative jurisdiction. According
to both the Venezuelan Constitution and to the Ley Orgdnica de la Corte
Suprema de Justicia,69 in Venezuela such contentious-administrative jurisdiction is exercised by courts that belong to the judiciary branch.7 ° More
specifically, the competence to exert control over the legality of acts of the
7'
Commission falls on the Corte Primera de lo Contencioso-Administrativo.

68. Horlick, supra'note 22, at 110.
69. Ley Orgdnica de la Corte Suprema de Justicia [Organic Law of the Supreme Court
of Justice], in G.O., No. 1893 Extraordinaire, July 30, 1976 [hereinafter LOCSJ]. .
70. See generally ALLAN R. BREWER-CARiAS, ESTADO DE DERECHO Y CONTROL
JUDICIAL:

JUSTICIA CONSTITUCIONAL,

CONTENCIOSO-ADMINISTRATIVO

Y DERECHO

DE

AMPARO 217 (1987). Although the expression "courts that belong to the judicial branch" may
seem redundant to some, in the Venezuelan contentious-administrative system, traditionally
influenced by French doctrine and jurisprudence, it may not be so. Indeed, in France, contentious-administrative jurisdiction is exercised by bodies within the Executive branch. See
ANDRt DE LAUBADtRE ET AL., 1 TRAITE DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 245-46 (11th ed. 1990).

7 1. First Court of the Contentious-Administrative [hereinafter CPCA.] This is despite the
fact that the Antidumping Law only establishes that the decisions of the Commission cannot
be subject to review by any other administrative authority (e.g., the Minister of Ascription).
Antidumping Law, supra note 2, art. 27. Whereas the Supreme Court of Justice, in its
Political-Administrative Chamber, knows of the actions or nullification demands, on grounds
of illegality against administrative acts in the cases mentioned in paragraphs 9-12 of article
42 of the LOCSJ; the LOCSJ also grants authority to the CPCA to "hear actions or
nullification demands that may be exercised on grounds of illegality against administrative acts
issued by authorities others than the ones mentioned in paragraphs 9, 10, 11, and 12, of article
42 of this Law, whenever hearing of said actions or demands has not been attributed to
another Court." LOCSJ, supra note 71, art. 185. The exact "content of this residual competence of the [CPCA] has been progressively established by jurisprudence, both from the Supreme Court and from the same [CPCA]." Josefina Calcaflo de Temeltas, Aspectos Generales
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Because the antidumping legislation is clear in its intent to attribute
authority to the Commission, any attempt by a different public entity or
agency to issue protective measures for domestic industries, based on the
Antidumping Law, clearly would be vitiated for incompetence (with the
exception of what was mentioned, in relation to the powers of contentiousadministrative courts). Yet the line of demarcation between competent and
incompetent application of power often is blurred. A particularly delicate
case arises, for example, if a court issues a measure of protection to a domestic industry in a manner or justification similar to an antidumping measure, but through the use of formally different legal instruments.
Something of this sort occurred in October 1992, when a lower regional
court in the State of Carabobo, relying on the Ley Orgdinicade Amparo sobre
Derechos y Garantias Constitucionales,72 granted constitutional protection
73
from allegedly dumped imports in favor of a domestic cement industry.
The Carabobo court's decision is clearly vitiated for incompetence. A special
law for antidumping matters exists, and it provides precautionary measures
to ensure the petitioning industries provisional protection against injuries
during the period of the antidumping investigation. The law also creates
special procedures and grants authority to a special agency to protect the domestic industry from unfair trade practices of dumping and subsidization.
Moreover, according to Venezuelan jurisprudence, because the entity that
made this decision exerted functions attributed to another branch of the
public powers (i.e., a court exerting powers attributed to the Executive), the
decision-making entity was thus "usurping functions." Consequently, the
court is "manifestly incompetent" to issue such decision. Manifest incompetence of the body issuing a decision is grounds to invalidate with "absolute
nullity" such act, with the result that it would be incapable of creating any
rights or privileges in favor of an individual.74

del Rdgimen Legal de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, in LEY ORGANICA DE LA CORTE
SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA 7, 128 (2d ed. 1991). It thus has been clear for some time now that
the power of nullification on grounds of illegality, over the "administrative acts issued by the
National Executive Power, but from authorities other than [the President of the Republic, the
Ministers, and the Heads of the Central Offices of the Presidency of the Republic] falls...
within the ... [CPCA];" such being the case for the administrative acts issued by the
Commission. See, e.g., Judgment of Feb. 14, 1985, Supreme Court of Justice, in PoliticalAdministrative Chamber, 90 JURISPRUDENCIA VENEZOLANA RAMiREZ & GARAY 697-700
(First Trimester 1985).
72. Ley Orgtinicade Amparo sobre Derechos y GarantiasConstitucionales[Organic Law
for Protection of the Constitutional Rights and Guarantees], in G.O., No. 33,891, Jan. 22,
1988.
73. See Decision No. 003-93 of May 7, 1993, Commission, in G.O., No. 35,221, May 28,

1993; see also GATT

ACTIVITIES

1992:

AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF THE WORK OF THE

53-54 (1993).
74. LOPA, supra note 13, art. 19(4).

GATT

See generally ALLAN R. BREWER-CARiAS, EL

DERECHO ADMINISTRATIVO Y LA LEY ORGANICA DE PROCEDIMIENTOs ADMINISTRATIVOS 171-
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C. A National Authority
The Antidumping Law grants antidumping competence to the Commission, a national authority.
This is consistent with the Venezuelan
Constitution's vertical distribution of powers between the Republic (national
power), the states, and the municipalities. According to such vertical distribution, the Republic has sole jurisdiction over "the international actions of
the Republic," the "organization, collection, and control of ... the contributions levied on imports," and "the organization and regulation of customs."7 5
The Venezuelan Constitution specifically establishes that states may not
"create customs nor import, export, or transit taxes, on foreign or domestic
goods. 76 By constitutional mandate, states and municipalities also cannot
issue regulations on international trade matters, of which antidumping regulations are only one part.
The Antidumping Law further states that the Commission's authority is
restricted to unfair practices cases in which the procedures "do not pertain to
the Junta del Acuerdo de Cartagena [JUNAC]7 7 according to the Andean
legal regulations. 78 In antidumping matters a potential vertical conflict of
competencies thus may arise between the Commission, a national authority,
and the JUNAC, an Andean community authority. Yet the Antidumping
Law's reference to the JUNAC should be actually read as a general reference
to Andean community authorities. The potential conflict is therefore between
the Venezuelan national authorities and such Andean authorities. The
relevant problem then is to determine when the Venezuelan Commission is
legally authorized to intervene in antidumping matters, and when it must
defer to Andean authorities.
As mentioned, the Antidumping Law only states that the Commission is
competent to "know and decide the procedures about dumping or about

73 (3d ed. 1992) (discussing the problem of manifest incompetence as a cause of absolute
nullity of administrative acts).
75. VENEZUELAN CONST., supra note 14, art. 136(1), (8) & (9).
76. Id. art. 18(1). See Humberto Romero-Muci, Aspectos Tributariosen la Ley Orgdnica
de Descentralizaci6n, Delimitaci6ny Transferencia de Competencias del Poder Ptiblico, in
LEYES PARA LA DESCENTRALIZACION POLITICA DE LA FEDERACI6N 177, 254-59 (1990):
Such prohibition is justified, not only because the specific competence of taxation
on the physical circulation of goods through political limits, is an exclusive
competence of the National Power, according to article 136, number 8Q ejusdem, but
also because if some state or municipal entity attempted to levy taxes on the transit
of goods through a specific part of its territory, such situation would imperil the
freedom of commerce and the organic integrity of the Republic ....
77. The Junta del Acuerdo de Cartagena is the Junta of the Cartagena Agreement
[hereinafter JUNAC].
78. Antidumping Law, supra note I, art. 27.
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subsidies [when these] do not pertain to the [JUNAC] according to the
Andean legal regulations."79 The relevant Andean legal regulations on this
matter are in Decisi6n 283 de la Comisi6n del Acuerdo de Cartagenadel 21
de marzo de 1991, que contiene las Normas para Prevenir o Corregir las
Distorsiones en la Competencia Generadas por Prcticas de Dumping o
Subsidios (Decision 283).8" According to the Decision 283, the JUNAC has
authority to know of petitions to impose antidumping measures in four
different cases. The first two cases deal with "Andean dumping." In these
cases, the dumping practice originates within an Andean country, and the
practice injures or threatens to injure the domestic production of another
Andean country destined for: (a) the internal market of the affected country;
or, (b) export to another Andean country.81 The two latter cases are known
as "third-country dumping." This dumping practice originates within a third,
non-Andean country and injures or threatens to injure: (a) an Andean
country's national production that is destined for export to another Andean
country; or, (b) an Andean country's national production of a good included
in the Arancel Externo Comin andino [Andean Common External Tariff],
and the corrective (or preventive) measure needs to be applied in more than
one Andean country, in order to be effective. 2
In conclusion, the Venezuelan antidumping legislation is consistent with
Andean community law as contained in Decision 283, deferring to the
authority of Andean community bodies in the cases mentioned. As long as
the process of regional economic integration advances, and, more specifically,
as the number of goods included in the Andean Common External Tariff
increases, the powers of Andean authorities in Venezuelan antidumping
matters will grow. In the meantime, however, both the Andean community
law contained in Decision 283 and Venezuela's Antidumping Law place
important caps on the powers of Andean authorities. In this respect, the
Andean community system is quite different from its European counterpart.
In the latter system, the European Community's member countries have
delegated their powers over international commercial relations to the Community. As a result, community - not national - authorities have almost

79. Id.
80. Decisi6n 283 de la Comisi6n del Acuerdo de Cartagenadel 21 de marzo de 1991, que
contiene las Normas para Preveniro Corregirlas Distorsionesen la Competencia Generadas
por Pricticasde Dumping o Subsidios [Decision 283 of the Commission of the Cartagena

Agreement, of March 21, 1991, that Contains the Rules to Prevent or Correct the Distortions
Generated by Practices of Dumping or Subsidies], in G.O., No. 4284 Extraordinaire, June 28,
1991 [hereinafter Decision 283].
81. Id. art. 2(a) & (b).
82. Id. art. 2(c) & (d).
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exclusive powers in antidumping matters.8 3 It thus remains to be seen how
much closer increased trade will draw Andean community law to its European counterpart.
D. A DeconcentratedAuthority
1. The Commission and Its "Sister Agencies"
When creating an administering authority for Venezuela's antidumping
legislation, the Congress opted for a different solution than that used in other
Venezuelan laws. In fact, while debating passage of the Antidumping Law,
the Venezuelan Congress also was discussing other laws, such as the
Antitrust Law and the Ley de Protecci6n al Consumidor.s4 In so doing,
Congress undertook to create of a single package of economic regulations.
In the end, the administration of each one of these laws was given to a
different agency. It is worth noting that, despite the traditional uniform
character of the Venezuelan administrative organization, 5 in this particular
case the law mandated a different organizational structure for each one of
these agencies. Whereas the Antidumping Law created a collegial agency
with no autonomous corporate status (a commission), the Antitrust Law
created a unipersonal agency (a superintendency),8 6 and the new Consumer
Protection Law created an agency with autonomous corporate status (an
',autonomous institute"). 87
There is no obvious reason why these three laws - the Antidumping
Law, Antitrust Law, and Consumer Protection Law - should have resulted
in the creation of such different structures. In fact, it is shocking considering

83. See also EDWIN A. VERMULST, ANTIDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE UNITED
STATES AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 311 (1987); Jean-Franqois Bellis, The EEC
Antidumping System, in ANTIDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 12, at 41, 44. See
generally JEAN GROUX & PHILIPPE MANIN, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES IN THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER 11 (1985).
84. Ley de Protecci6n al Consumidor[1992 Consumer Protection Law], in G.O., No. 4403
Extraordinaire, Mar. 24, 1992.

85. See generally BREWER-CARiAS, supra note 62, at 41-42 (finding deplorable the
characteristic uniformity of the Venezuelan administrative organization).
86. The Superintendencia para la Promoci6n y Protecci6n de la Libre Competencia
[Superintendency for the Promotion and Protection of Free Competition] was created in similar
terms to the ones in which article 23 of the 1974 Ley de Protecci6n al Consumidor [1974
Consumer Protection Law] had created a Superintendencia de Protecci6n al Consumidor
[Superintendency for Consumer Protection]. Antidumping Law, supra note 1, art. 19; 1974
Ley de Protecci6n al Consumidor [1974 Consumer Protection Law], in G.O., No. 1680
Extraordinaire, Sept. 2, 1974.
87. The Instituto para la Defensa y Educaci6n al Consumidor [Institute for the Defense
and Education of the Consumer] replaced the old Superintendency for Consumer Protection,
which the 1974 Consumer Protection Law had created. 1992 Consumer Protection Law, supra
note 84, art. 63. See 1974 Consumer Protection Law, supra note 86, art. 23.
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the Venezuelan administrative tradition. The creation of a corporate agency
for consumer protection, in particular, was in stark contrast to the new
agencies within the Ministerio de Fomento for antitrust and antidumping
matters. There are several reasons, however, why an "autonomous institute"
may be desirable. First, such an institute would break the principle of unity
of the treasury. Second, its structure would "ensur[e] a more flexible
management of public funds." Third, an autonomous institute would address
the necessity of creating "entities more flexible than the state." Such
flexibility would allow government both to "pursue more easily its goals"
through the "application of a singular and specific statutory legal regime,"
and to contend with the new necessities the increased participation of the
state in the economy generated, "for which the old-fashioned public
administration was unsuited."8' No obvious reason thus exists to create an
"autonomous institute" in only one case out of three. 9 It could be, however, that the different solutions were influenced by the models that the drafters
of each project took .from comparative law.
2.

The Ascription to the Ministerio de Fomento

The antidumping legislation ascribes the Commission to the Ministerio
de Fomento. This may seem logical, considering the fact that the Ministerio
de Fomento has traditionally played the role of ministry of industry and trade
in Venezuela.90 The whole issue, however, deserves some additional
commentary.
In its distribution of competence among ministries, the LOAC does not

88. Mariano Baena del Alc~izar, Los Entes FuncionalmenteDescentralizadosysuRelaci6n
con la AdministracirnCentral,44 REVISTA DE ADMINISTRACION POBLICA (Madrid) 59, 60-62

(1964).
89. An apparent explanation may have to do with factors other than strictly juridical or
pertaining to administrative organization techniques. In fact, the previous existence for eight
years, of a Superintendency for Consumer Protection - along with the specific political
power of its superintendent - when Congress was discussing the Project of Reform to the
Consumer Protection Law, may have resulted in the creation of a more powerful "autonomous
institute." The traditional power of the Superintendents of Consumer Protection may have
resulted from their powers in the enforcement of pervasive price controls. See Naim, supra
note 5, at 55.
Usually, both Congress and the Executive may be reluctant to create such "autonomous
institutes," because they have considerable more flexibility, and are perceived as having less
accountability regarding the management of their own financial resources. Similarly, the fact
that during the last stages of discussion of the Antitrust Law Project, there was already a
candidate - with strong backing from the Executive - to head the resulting agency, may
have resulted in the creation of a superintendency, a unipersonal figure with more power to
such head of the agency. Neither of these circumstances happened with respect to the
discussion of the Antidumping Law Project, resulting in the agency with the weakest amount
of power for its head, the President of the Commission.
90. See, e.g., BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 62, at 104.
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attribute antidumping competence to any specific ministry. This is not surprising. As a matter novel to Venezuelan law, the antidumping law was
passed later in time than the 1986 LOAC. The LOAC could, however, be
interpreted as expressing a legislative intent to attribute to the Ministerio de
Fomento generic competence that may include, among other matters,
antidumping. 9' The problem with that line of analysis is that the LOAC
does expressly grant the Ministry of Foreign Relations responsibility over
"the conduction, coordination, and centralization of foreign trade and integration policy." 92 This assignment is consistent with the Ministry of Foreign
Relations's power over the ICE as its ministry of ascription. 9'
The Antidumping Law explicitly ascribes the Commission to the
Ministerio de Fomento. Because the Antidumping Law is later-in-time and
more specific to the antidumping matter than the LOAC, it should clear any
possible doubts as to the Commission's ascription. However, a potential
problem remains. In recent years, Congress has discussed several projects
to reform the LOAC. One recent project proposed to substitute a Ministerio
de Industria y Comercio [Ministry of Trade and Commerce] for the
Ministerio de Fomento. If such a reform passed, and if the new law kept in
its text the foreign trade responsibilities that the Ministry of Foreign Relations currently has, the problem of interpretation would resurface. If Congress wishes to keep the ascription Of the Commission with the new Ministry
of Industry and Trade, in order to avoid a misinterpretation of its real intent,
any reform of the LOAC should include an article that expressly attributes
to the Ministry of Industry and Trade: (a) competence in antidumping
matters; or, (b) all responsibilities that special laws had attributed to the
Ministerio de Fomento.
3. Is the Commission Really a Deconcentrated Authority?
The Antidumping Law expressly defines the Commission as a
"deconcentrated agency., 94 It could be argued, however, that in the Venezuelan legal tradition such a declaration only means that the law did not
intend for the Commission to have its own corporate personality. Rather, in

91. According to the LOAC, the Ministerio de Fomento is responsible for "planning and
executing the activities of the National Executive in the industry and trade sectors." Elaborating further, the same article makes the Ministerio de Fomento "in particular" responsible for
"the planning, regulation, supervision, protection, and development of industrial production ... ; the intervention in the planning, regulation, conduction, supervision, protection,
development, and exercise of domestic trade ... ; industrial productivity; [and] licenses,
quotas and other import restrictions .... "LOAC, supra note 46, art. 28(2), (3), (11) & (21).
Such powers could arguably cover antidumping matters.
92. LOAC, supra note 46, art. 25(4).
93. ICE Law, supra note 38, art 1.
94. Antidumping Law, supra note 1, art. 27.
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the terms the same law established, the Commission was designed as part of
the structure of the Ministerio de Fomento, its ministry of ascription. 95 The
problem 'is that legal doctrine has also interpreted "deconcentration" as
having a second meaning, that of little autonomy with respect to the central
entity.96

With regard to this second meaning of "deconcentration," the

Antidumping Law is less explicit. Consequently, the problem is to determine
whether, in this second sense, the Commission is a "decentralized" rather
than a "deconcentrated" agency (i.e., with considerable autonomy from its
central entity, the Ministerio de Fomento). Such determination goes beyond
the question of whether the Commission has its own legal personality, which
it does not. What must be determined is the juridical nature of the
relationship between the Commission and the Ministerio de Fomento, or, in
other words, whether the Commission is "subject or not to a hierarchical
power." 97

95. Traditional Venezuelan legal doctrine has defined deconcentration as an administrative
organization technique by which "a distribution of competence operates among agencies of
the same entity." By contrast, decentralization traditionally implies, by definition, the existence
of a different corporate "person," and is the case in which "a transference of competence is
made to different corporate persons from the transferring entity." The crux of the distinction
between deconcentration and decentralization is that in the former "a relationship is established between agencies," and in the latter "a relationship is established between different
subjects of law, that is, between different juridical persons." BREWER-CARiAS, supra note 62,
at 39, 68. See also supra note 18. Venezuelan legislative tradition confirms the doctrinal
construct that associates deconcentration with lack of corporate status of the receiving entity.
As an example, we can again compare the text of the Antidumping Law with those of other
laws that Congress passed around the same period of time. See supra part II.D. 1.
96. For part of the legal doctrine, what distinguishes deconcentration from decentralization
is not the lack of two entities with different juridical personality, but the nature itself of the
juridical relationship between the central entity and the deconcentrated authority.
It is a technical criterion that depends on the degree of independencia o dependencia
[independence or dependence] that the different centers of power have .... with
respect to the State ... decentralization means "independence" in the functioning

and decision powers, while centralization means full functional dependence of the
entities with respect to the central organs - with or without powers of decision
.-.... The identification between decentralization and transference [of powers]
between different juridical persons is incorrect. The criterion of centralization and
decentralization must be found in the degree of dependence or independence, this
is, analyzing the tutelage relationship between the two centers ....
Alfredo

Gallego

Anabitarte,

Transferencia y

Descentralizaci6n; Delegaci6n y

Desconcentraci6n; Mandato y Gesti6n a Encomienda, 122 REVISTA DE ADMINISTRAC16N
PUBLICA (Madrid) 7, 9-11 (1990). In strict terms, Gallego refers in his article to decentralization in the context of vertical distribution of powers, i.e., decentralization among
different territorial entities. However, the discussion of the problem of decentralization in
legal doctrine, developed mostly in the territorial context, has traditionally been translated with
success to the context of the so-called "functional decentralization."
97. Carlos Carrasco Canals, Un Criterio OrganizatorioPolmico: La Desconcentraci6n,

75

REVISTA DE ADMINISTRACION POBLICA

(Madrid) 93, 125-26 (1974).
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Juridical Nature of the Relationship Between the Commission and the
Ministerio de Fomento

With respect to the juridical nature of the relationship between the
Commission and the Ministerio. de Fomento, a literal study of the
Antidumping Law reveals some problems. According to some aspects of
Venezuelan legal doctrine, when the Antidumping Law defines the Commission as a deconcentrated agency, it establishes a hierarchical relationship
between the ministry and the Commission. In contrast with decentralization,
deconcentration, as a technique of administrative organization, preserves a
hierarchical relationship between the head of the central organ and the
deconcentrated organ.98 However, the traditional interpretation turns out to
be inadequate for this analysis because it fails to explain'why the relationship
between the Ministro de Fomento and the Commission lacks all the main
features of hierarchical relationships.
In a hierarchical relationship, the hierarch has broad powers over the
subordinate organs. "What characterizes hierarchy is the position of supremacy of the superior organ over the inferior and inversely, the subordination
of the latter to the former." 99 The hierarch may, by virtue of her powers,
issue orders to subordinates and revoke or reform any act the latter issues.
Once the existence of a hierarchical relationship has been established, these
broad powers of the hierarch are presumed, and in the absence of legal text
to the contrary, are deemed to exist."
Such broad powers are clearly inconsistent with the relationship that the
Antidumping Law created between the Ministro de Fomento and the Commission. First, despite its supposed powers as a hierarch and what the LOPA
establishes as a general principle, l° ' the Ministro de Fomento cannot review
the acts of the Commission either on her own or as a result of appeals
against such acts. The Commission's acts are not subject to administrative

98. GEORGES VEDEL & PIERRE DELVOLVE, DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 849-53 (9th ed.
See also RENE CHAPUS, I DROIT ADMINISTRATIF GENIRAL 254 (4th ed. 1988).

1984).

99. Hildegard Rond6n de Sans6, La PotestadOrganizativa en el Derecho Venezolano, in
4 ESTUDIOS SOBRE LA CONSTITUCiON, supra note 46, at 2105, 2143.
100. VEDEL & DELVOLVt, supra note 98, at 853-55.
101. The LOPA establishes the possibility of exercising a hierarchical appeal before the
minister, against the acts issued by subordinate authorities of the corresponding ministry.
LOPA, supra note 13, arts. 20(18) & 95. See BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 74, at 346-47.
Similarly, the LOPA allows a minister, on her own, to review acts issued by subordinate
authorities of the corresponding ministry and as a result, to correct any material errors, to
validate, to revoke - in whole or in part - such acts, as well as to recognize - at any time
- when such acts are affected by reason of absolute nullity. With the exception of acts affected by absolute nullity, the decision of the minister may not affect acts creating individual
rights, or personal, legitimate, and direct interests, in favor of individuals. LOPA, supra note
13, arts. 81-83. See BREWER-CARiAS, supra note 74, at 66-69.
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review by the Ministro de Fomento or by any other authority.' °2 This also
implies that the Ministro de Fomento cannot take over a case and exercise
powers that correspond to the Commission. As a result, if members of the
Commission were legally impeded from participating in a decision, for
example by reason of conflict of interest, substitutes for such members
should be called instead of remitting the file to the minister for her deci03
sion. 1
Second, the Ministro de Fomento cannot issue regulations or general
rules in order to conduct the activity of the Commission. Only the President
of the Republic has the constitutional power to issue regulations of the
Antidumping Law.' 4 * This does not preclude the Ministro de Fomento,
through a ministerial resolution, from issuing directives of general applicability to the whole ministry (for example, rules relating to the management
of resources of the ministry). The personnel of the Commission would have
to enforce and follow these directives. However, in matters relating to its
specific authority (i.e., antidumping matters), the Commission is not obligated
to follow orders or instructions from the Ministro de Fomento. Moreover,
regardless of the legal principle of hierarchy of administrative acts, the
Commission could in matters of its specific authority issue acts that
contradict decisions or rules that the Ministro de Fomento issues. 10 5
Third, the Ministro de Fomento is limited with regard to the possibilities
of intervening in the Commission personnel regime. The members of the
Commission (the Commissioners) are appointed, and they may only be
removed by the President of the Republic for the causes enumerated in the
Antidumping Law.1°6 The Antidumping Law also establishes the principle
that the President of the Commission is competent to manage the
Commission's personnel.0 7 The Ministro de Fomento thus has no power
to appoint authorities or other functionaries to the Commission, nor to exer-

102. Antidumping Law, supra note 1,art. 27.
103. The rules contained in LOPA, ch. II, tit. II;
would thus not apply; instead, the alternate
members of the Commission would have to be called, in accordance with Antidumping Law,
supra note 1, art. 29.
104. See supra part II.B.6.
105. One of the consequences of the principle of legality - or rule of Law - established
in the LOPA, is that a subordinate administrative authority cannot issue an act in violation of
a ministerial resolution of the corresponding minister.. LOPA, supra note 13, arts. 13, 14 &
16. The case mentioned is not a violation of such principle, since the Ministro de Fomento
is legally impeded to act on antidumping matters. No conflict would thus exist between administrative acts of different hierarchy. If there was a decision by the Ministro de Fomento
in antidumping matters, for example, granting protection to a domestic industry allegedly
injured by dumping, or even making an interpretation of the Antidumping Law, such decision
would be vitiated by incompetence.
106. Antidumping Law, supra note 1,arts. 28-30.
107. Id. art. 35, para. 2(1).
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cise disciplinary powers over them-which ministers usually have with
respect to their subordinate functionaries.
Absent the typical and most important aspects of the hierarchical relationship, the Commission would thus seem, by the intent of the Antidumping
Law, autonomous and independent from the Ministeriode Fomento. Yet this
is hardly so. The fact that the Commission lacks corporate status and, most
important, does not have its own estate, creates financial limitations that in
practice subject the Commission to the tutelage of the ministry. Such
financial limitations render the Commission less autonomous than it would
seem, and more vulnerable in front of the central powers.
III.

CONCLUSIONS

The organization of the Commission in the Venezuelan legal system is
an interesting case study. The antidumping legislation avoided the trauma
of automatically transplanting a foreign institution without regard for the historical and juridical traditions of the Venezuelan public administration.
Aware of not operating in a void, the law ensured a smooth landing for the
Commission in the Venezuelan administrative structure. In so doing, the
Venezuelan antidumping legislation in some aspects.differs from antidumping
legislation in other countries. This disparity should not be interpreted as
ignorance of (or worse, as arrogant indifference to) the greater experience
that other countries have in antidumping matters. Rather, it reflects the
capacity of some of the domestic institutions of each country to adapt to, and
to manage, novel areas of state regulation. Only time will permit a better
appraisal of the strengths and weaknesses of the Venezuelan antidumping
legislation. Until such time, however, perhaps the Commission's primary
source of concern will be a legal system that, on the one hand, empowers it
with formidable authority, and on the other, subjects it to the financial
control of the central organs.
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